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By Immanuel Kant.
Translated, with an Introduction, by John Ladd. Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill. 1965. Pp. 150. $1.45. (Paperback).
THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE.

The year 1966 has brought the American people past the midway mark in a decade which has been characterized by fundamental
and widespread changes in attitudes and reactions to many facets of
human action and inaction. Incessant grasping for what lies ahead
or what perhaps seems to be only a short distance ahead has traditionally been regarded as one of the basic features of the American
psyche. During certain periods in the past with respect to certain
spheres of human activity, this characterization of the American
people has been looked upon by some individuals as more of a myth
than a reality. These persons insisted that the nation was not proceeding swiftly enough toward the attainment of certain worthwhile
objectives. American history is replete with examples of individuals
who sought to secure basic changes in the pattern of our society
speedily. Illustrative of efforts in this direction have been the third
party movements1 and the establishment of communities dedicated
to the idea of erecting a utopia within our national boundaries. 2
However, through the 1920's, demands that the nation head off
in an essentially new direction were, for the most part, rejected.
Although the century and a half that followed the founding of the
nation witnessed numerous alterations in American society and the
laying of portions of the foundation upon which new structures
could be built, no cleavage with the past was ever so deep and extensive in our nation's development as that which took place
after the advent of the Great Depression. The 1960's have reflected

1. See generally NASH, THIRD PARTIES IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1959). One of the most
significant third parties in American history was the Populist Party. See HrcKS, THE
POPULIST REvoLT (1931). Populism has been viewed as a product of environment.
See POLI.ACK, POPULIST REsPONSE TO INDUSTRIAL .AMERICA (1962).
2. See generally HERTZLER, THE HlsTORY OF UTOPIAN THOUGHT (1923): KATEB,
UTOPIA AND ITS ENEMIES (1963).

December 1966]

Recent Books

407

responses to long-restrained pushes and pulls-some of which have
roots that can be traced back to the first half of the nineteenth
century-aimed at effecting changes.
One who is close to events which he undertakes to describe and
evaluate in terms of their impact on long-term trends is subject to
the danger of over-emphasizing the significance of such events. He is
prone to exaggerate the scope of their meaning, for proximity frequently lends an aura of importance to occurrences. A retrospective
examination, on the other hand, often has an opposite effect. Acknowledging, therefore, that one ·wTiting in 1966 may not successfully elude the aforementioned pit-falls, the following conclusions
nonetheless appear to be warranted by the events which have taken
place within the last three decades.
In the course of the past thirty years, thought, as well as conduct,
has undergone a fundamental shift in emphasis. Desiderata, as well
as the means used to attain them, have been substantially changed.
Long respected concepts, oftentimes regarded as basic in nature and
viewed as determinative of what is "right" and what is "·wrong,"
have been swept away or in some fashion modified. In the face of
this shifting emphasis, the incidents of old attitudes and ideas
could not remain untouched; restraints imposed upon various
sectors of the American society, as well as the protection accorded to
others, were battered and punctured in the 1930's. By 1966 the
list of shibboleths either laid to rest or partially discarded included:
(I) the almost sacrosanct treatment accorded certain activities of the
business community, on account of which businessmen enjoyed
the right to determine by and for themselves, within the confines
of a broad spectrum of right and wrong, how they would conduct
their commercial and industrial affairs; (2) the admonition that
laissez-faire and the Jeffersonian approach to government insure the
attainment of the most desirable form of social, political, and
economic structure; (3) the idea that individuals should have the
freedom to pursue their own goals by means of any lawful steps
believed to be essential, so long as both the benefits of success and
the undesirable consequences of failure are accepted; (4) the belief
that the interaction of supply and demand, combined with competition and the individual's pursuit of his own self-interest, unfettered
by government intervention, is the appropriate regulator of the
market place; and (5) the view that, to the extent compulsive powers
of government must be invoked, the state rather than the federal
government should be entrusted with the job of determining the
necessary minimum quantum of governmental activity. Even a passing observation of our contemporary societal format reveals the extent to which each of the foregoing ideas has been altered, if not
actually obliterated.
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Is there a single attitude, common likeness, similarity of thought,
or cohesiveness that one can discern after carefully examining the
manifestations of change that have been provided by the new standards of propriety? Has there been a fundamental frame of reference
that has played a determinative role in shaping the pattern of responses and events that have taken place since the beginning of
Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal? At first blush one might, out
of hand, unequivocally answer "no"! To insist that a single factor
can be utilized by an observer to explain the moving forces underlying the pattern of events of several- decades may be looked upon as
an indication of the observer's na'ivete. But the more one probes
what has taken place in the immediate past and is taking place currently in the United States, the· greater the probability that he will
experience a sensation of having uncovered evidence that the question should be answered with an equivocal "yes." The more one
digs, the more one scrutinizes, the more he is attracted to, and in
time perhaps even overwhelmed by, the following proposition: The
thread of resemblance, the stitching that seems to tie together a
goodly number of the changes and events that have occurred and are
taking place, is the growing national interest in the integrity of the
individual.
Our society has concurrently grown in size and been subjected
to shocks caused by the fruits of modem technology. The words
"regimentation" and "interdependence" have been used to describe
many aspects of American life in the immediate past as well as in
the present. Each American is surrounded today by an unprecedented number of other human beings, as well as by techniques
that may be used to measure and control his own conduct.3 Realizing the significance of these facts, and finding distasteful the anonymity ascribed to some members of our mass society, persons from
various sectors of society have sought to find new and meaningful
roles for the individual.
In this setting, it is not surprising to find that those charged
with formulating the content of our legal system have manifested
a growing concern for the welfare of the individual. American lawmakers have joined in the struggle for the survival of the individual
as an entity, indeed, as a figure of importance, in an impersonal
milieu. Laws have been changed and continue to be modified as the
battle for the preservation of the individual is waged. 4 The fear
3. Physical crowding, technology, and their impact on American society were
the subjects of an address by August Heckscher which was printed and distributed
by the Twentieth Century Fund, Inc., in 1965, in pamphlet form, under the title
"The Individual and the Mass."
4. A recently-published work devoted to a study of the expansion of individual
liberty, under the aegis of the judiciary, since the end of World War ll is KoNvrrz,
Exl>ANDING Ln!ERTIFS (1966).
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that a single member of society is for all practical purposes dwarfed
to insignificance by the growing size of government and its spheres
of competence, by the capacities of man-made devices and by human
ingenuity in finding new uses for such mechanisms, has fomented
vigorous defensive efforts.I• In the course of the conflict, our legal
system has been seized as a shield as well as an offensive weapon
to hold at bay and to ward off those forces that have tended to
decimate the integrity of the individual. Some of the responses of
those who breathe life into our law can be found in the treatment of
indigents, the concern for the ratio of voters to representatives in the
nation's legislative bodies, the manner in which members of
minority groups are dealt with, and the restraints imposed upon
individuals and particular groups.
The new translation of Immanuel Kant's The Metaphysical
Elements of Justice, and the accompanying forty-eight page introduction-each the work of John Ladd, Professor of Philosophy at
Brown University--offer a refreshing and welcome beacon for those
who are searching for an answer to the question: "What standard
of right and wrong should a people employ in order to determine
whether its body of court-enforced norms is desirable?" 6 The succinctly written and lucidly presented introduction, and the captivating and clearly prepared translation permit one to indulge joyously
in pondering Kant's proposals relating to the prime objectives of
a country's legal system. Kant's work, published in its original
form approximately a century and a half ago, has an almost unbelievable relevancy to the current era: the philosophy of law is keyed
to the individual human being, his freedom and his personal integrity; the role of the state is envisaged as that of a guardian-the
protector of individual freedom.
Immanual Kant was born in East Prussia in 1724. He died in
1804, after a life in which he had not strayed far from his place of
birth. This man, whose life has been depicted as an "ivory tower"
prototype, not only exerted a significant influence on the philosophical thought of his day, but also has affected succeeding generations of philosophers.7 His insight, ability to formulate general prin5. At its 1966 Annual Meeting, the American Bar Association established a Section on "Individual Rights and Responsibilities." Members of this division have
the task of studying and suggesting to the Association the position it should take on
socio-legal issues, For the history and composition of the new body, see N.Y. Times,
August 9, 1966, pp. 1, 26.
6. Prior to the appearance of Professor Ladd's book, a translation by William
Hastie, published in 1887, was the only widely-circulated English version of Kant's
work devoted to his philosophy of law. Hastie's work is entitled The Philosophy of
Law, An Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of Jurisprudence.
7. The part Kant played in the evolution of German thought is discussed in
BOSSENBROOK, THE GERMAN MIND 227-35 (1961). Kant, his ideas, and their influence
are prC!ellted in an interesting fashion in DILL, GERMANY 59-60 (1961).
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ciples, and capacity to communicate ideas have earned him a lasting
place in the history of philosophy. 8
Kant's philosophy has been described as realistic, formal, rational, idealistic and transcendental: realistic, in the sense that he
eschewed the idea that human passions and sentiment could be
beneficially utilized to decide whether a particular standard of
conduct was right or wrong; formal, in that he insisted that a
particular procedure had to be followed if one were to arrive at a
correct conclusion, placing great stress on the use of logic; rational,
in that he extolled the power of human beings to reason, assuming
that all men possess the ability to act in a rational fashion and to
guide themselves exclusively by reason; idealistic, since at the core
of his philosophy is respect for individual freedom, the shunning
of dogma, and the rejection of unwarranted conformity and regimentation; transcendental, in that he looked for ends and means
that were independent of man's environment and human experience, insisting that standards of right and wrong had universal
applicability.
In this volume Kant did not undertake to set forth a desirable,
detailed, in-toto set of laws for a nation. Instead, he tried to convey
to the reader his thinking pertaining to the general philosophical
base upon which the legal system of a civilized society should be
structured. The Metaphysical Elements of Justice does not embody
an enumeration of specifics. It contains Kant's personal attitude
toward the law and his plea for its acceptance by society. Kant's
presentation leaves the concrete application of his directives to those
persons who are obligated to rule upon the apportionment of rights
and duties between individuals and between an individual and
the state.
The crux of Kant's philosophy is the antithesis of what many
individuals now consider to be an essential element of a meaningful
approach to the "is" as well as the "ought" of the law. Responsiveness to environment has been hailed by numerous proponents of
change as the correct base upon which to build a nation's legal
system. Kant argued against this proposition, labelling his philosophy of law "metaphysical." Metaphysical, in the Kantian sense, is
a non-scientific and non-empirical approach to law. According to
Kant, government-enforced norms should not reflect the results of
experiments and inquiries which probe man or his environment.
Rather, such norms should be determined on an a priori basis, their
content to be the product of man's rational, disinterested, practical,
pure reasoning processes. Kant vehemently attacked the idea that
human conduct should be shaped by environment, observations and
conclusions based on past or present events, man's passions or his
8. For a consideration of Kant's philosophy and its relationship to current-day
attitudes toward freedom, see MULI..ER, FREEDOM IN nm MODERN WORLD (1966).
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predispositions. He boldly proclaimed that impersonal reason must
be the source of the demands formulated and imposed by the lawmakers. Kant refused to accept the premise that the best way to test
the validity of a legal standard is to invoke the scientific method.
Resorting to attempts to verify the propriety of an enforceable
standard of human conduct by studying its effect on man and
society was foreign to Kant's philosophy.9 He insisted that the correctness of a rule of law should be determined by relying solely
upon reason.
In Kant's opinion, the fundamental frame of reference of all law
should be the protection and the promotion of individual freedom.
One of the most important underpinnings of his thinking was his
insistence upon respect for the autonomy of the individual. No
man, according to Kant, should be used as a tool to secure the attainment of certain objectives. The freedom of each individual,
Kant urged, was to be viewed as the objective of the law. Individual
freedom was therefore the focal point of Kant's test of whether a
legal principle was good or bad; if it advanced individual freedom,
it was good, whereas if it hampered the exercise of individual
freedom, it was bad.
It is especially interesting to note that although Kant regarded
the advancement of freedom as the ultimate goal of law, he did
not advocate the per se elimination of the powers of the state. Here,
Kant's attitude was diametrically opposite to that manifested by
those who, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, were enraptured by and glorified man's status in a primitive and stateless
society. 1° Kant stated that man's freedom could not be assured,
absent the existence of an organized state government. He believed
that freedom was not self-enforcing. In a state of nature, devoid of
government, man could readily be denied his freedom, for might
was the determining factor. Kant espoused the proposition that the
compulsive powers of the state could, and should, be invoked to
shield and advance individual freedom.
Kant's insistence upon individual freedom, however, did not
mean that he argued in favor of unrestricted freedom for each and
every person to do precisely as he desired. Rather, Kant drew the
9. Compare Kant's attitude with that of the Supreme Court contained in Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) wherein the Court rejected the "separatebut-equal doctrine" which had previously been relied upon as a basis to sustain
segregation. Mr. Chief Justice Warren wrote: "We must consider public education in
the light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout
the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools
deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws." Id. at 492-93. In supporting footnotes, the Court cited reports based on studies of the impact of segregation on individuals. Id. at 494-95 nn. 10, 11.
10. John Locke (1632-1704) was one of the leading political theorists who glorified
the individual. He differed from Kant in that he looked to the individual, rather
than the state, for the protection of freedom. Two of Locke's treaties were reprinted
in 1924 under the title Of Civil Government.
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line between proper restraint and valued freedom as follows: One
man's freedom was circumscribed by boundaries that surrounded·
the outermost limits of another man's freedom. 11 A man was not
free to act in a manner that would infringe upon the breadth of
permissible freedom of another individual.12 According to Kant,
man's a priori reasoning should fashion the norms essential to secure
and promote individual freedom, and the powers of the state could
then be utilized to put them into effect.
Kant's belief that man is capable of devising a suitable system
of law was consistent with his personal appraisal of human beings.
He believed that human beings are socially-oriented, good and
ethical. These traits, he contended, permit men to be the creator
of desirable legal standards. Such features, according to Kant, are
possessed by all human beings, and from this premise followed his
contention that there are certain universal rules that the legal
systems of all nations must enforce. Kant's universality of law concept is reminiscent of the natural law philosophy.13 However, unlike many proponents of natural law, Kant, as we have seen, maintained that man must rely upon reason, rather than looking to a
Supreme Being or environment in devising state-enforced norms. 14
Infliction of punishment, according to Kant, is the only type of
action that society, through its legal system, might properly take
against one convicted of a crime. He condemned the view that individuals who offend the penal law should, under certain circumstances, be taken under the beneficent and protective wings of
the state with a view toward their rehabilitation. Kant's refusal
to accept the proposition that the criminal law can be used as a
means to reconstruct those who violated its commands and transform them into worthwhile members of society re.fleets his lack of
interest in environmental factors. He regarded the criminal as an
atypical human being. To dole out punishment to one who breaks
one or more of society's mandates, as far as Kant was concerned,
is rational. He regarded any other use of the criminal law as
inappropriate.111
11. Kant wrote of the need for an accommodation between freedom and state
power. He stated that if men were to enjoy freedom it was necessary that these two
competing factors co-exist in "harmony" with one another. See generally .AR.'IZ,
REACTION AND REVOLUTION 75-76 (1934).
12. The depth of attention Kant paid to the idea of freedom under law, rather
than freedom without state-imposed restraints, is dealt with in CAmn, THE CRinCAL
PHILOSOPHY OF IMMANUEL KANT 171, 254 (1909),
13. For an examination of natural law and freedom, see MARITAIN, THE RlcH'IS
OF MAN AND NATURAL LAW (Anson transl. 1943).
14. The influence of theology on natural law is examined in RAMSEY, NINE MODERN
MORALISTS (1962).
15. Criminal law and the demands of environmental factors, as well as the use
of knowledge amassed and theories formulated by members of other disciplines are
considered in HALL, STUDIES IN JURISl'RUDENCB AND CRIMINAL Tm:ORY (1958). See
also MANNHEIM, Cru:MINAL JumCB AND SoCIAL RECONSTRUCITON (1946) for a discussion
of the rehabilitation approach to the treatment of criminals.
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Kant was, in a W?,-y, a polemicist. He examined areas of human
activity which he believed were in need of consideration and then
proceeded to construct his proposals of how particular problems
should be handled. He immersed himself in a study of the "ought"
of the law. For those who have devoted or are now devoting some
portion of their time to a consideration of such matters as civil
rights and the liberties of the individual, this volume will prove
to be especially fascinating reading.
Many persons have been attracted to the philosophy that the
promotion of individual freedom should be the prime objective of
all national legal systems as well as of international law. 16 However,
there is a growing awareness that unrestricted freedom may at times
be as detrimental to human freedom as excessive restraints imposed
by the state. Kant, in his Metaphysical Elements, insisted that individuals are obliged to obey the laws of the state. This does not
mean that Kant favored a dictatorial state. His position here is consistent with his premise that it is the state which, by using its
coercive powers, can guarantee individual freedom. Absent enforceable laws individuals would be denied freedom. Kant's contention
that some restraints upon freedom are essential for freedom touches
upon one of the most difficult problems facing our legal system
today-civil disobedience and lawlessness carried on under the
banner of freedom. 17
16. An individual's right to life, liberty and security of his person are among the
rights included in the International Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. R.Ec.
!Id Sess., Res. No. 217, at 71 (A/810) (1948). The Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed November 4, 1950, by the member
states of the Council of Europe, guaranteed individual liberty to subjects of each
of the states. The text of the Convention is contained in EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, DOCUMENTS AND DECISIONS 1955-1956-1957 2-91 (1959). See Tucker, Has
The Individual Become The Subject of International Law?, !14 U. CINC. L. REv. !141
(1965).
17. Several of the decisions handed down during the 1965-1966 term of the
Supreme Court emphasize the Court's appreciation of the urgency that it keep a
"sense of balance" when it is called upon to determine individual rights. One person's rights, as well as the rights of other individuals, must be accorded recognition
simultaneously. In Miranda v. Arizona, !184 U.S. 4!16 (1966), Mr. Chief Justice Warren
wrote: "The cases before us raise questions which go to the roots of our concepts
of American criminal jurisprudence: the restraints society must observe consistent
with the Federal Constitution in prosecuting individuals for crime." Id. at 4!19, In
Miranda the Court ruled that a confession made by a defendant while in the custody of the police could not be used in a state criminal proceeding unless he had
been warned, prior to making the confession, that he had a right to remain silent,
that any statement he might make could thereafter be used as evidence against him
and that he had the right to have an attorney at his side, either one he retained
or one who was appointed, to advise him. The Court, in support of its result, cited
the report of the 1961 Commission on Civil Rights. In Malloy v. Hogan, !178 U.S. 1
(1964), the Court held that the fourteenth amendment prohibited the states from
compelling an individual to incriminate himself. The Court's current concern for
the rights of individuals was reflected in its holding in Sheppard v. Maxwell !184
U.S. llll!I (1966) wherein a state court criminal conviction was reversed on the ground
that the defendant could not have had a fair trial due to the large amount of
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Professor Ladd's excellent introduction lays a fine groundwork
for an appreciation of Kant's Metaphysical Elements of Justice.
Ladd not only touches upon major points of Kant's thinking, but
also explains numerous terms employed by this giant of philosophy.
The explanations facilitate one's reading of Kant; they make the
perusal of this work more enjoyable than it might otherwise be,
since Kant used many terms which he himself formulated to communicate his thoughts to his audience.
The legal philosophy buff will :find irresistable the :fine glossary
of Kant's German terms, with their English translations, which is
contained in this book. This reviewer happily greeted Kant's "Supplemental Explanations of the Metaphysical Elements of Justice,"
(immediately preceding the glossary), which is Kant's response to
a review of The Metaphysical Elements of Justice. In his reply to
the review, Kant expounded upon some of his thoughts which the
reviewer contended were not clearly presented or with which the
reviewer took issue.
This volume is well-ordered, extensively footnoted and attractively arranged. College students, law students, lawyers, law professors and all persons who wish to add to their storehouse of knowledge or re-evaluate their personal ideas about freedom and law will
heartily welcome this presentation of the thoughts of one of the
foremost philosophers of Western Civilization. Professor Ladd's
efforts and their product should prove to be extremely satisfying
and valuable reading.
Edwin W. Tucker,
Associate Professor of
Business Administration,
The University of Connecticut

adverse publicity which appeared in the newspapers prior to and during the course
or his trial. However, concern for society's interests outweighed the right of the
individual in the eyes of the majority of the Court in Ginzburg v, United States,
383 U.S. 463 (1966). In Ginzburg the Court sustained the conviction of the defendant
who had been accused of violating the Federal obscenity statute, In the Court's
opinion the defendant had engaged in "commercial exploitation of erotica solely
for the sake of their prurient appeal" and therefore had gone beyond the scope of
protection guaranteed by the first amendment. Id. at 466. For a discussion of the need
to balance responsibility of the individual and the freedom to publish, see Epstein,
The Obscenity Business, The Atlantic, Aug. 1966, pp. 56-60.

